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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
sas courts seem to have passed on the status of such government officials.
The problem as to policemen arose in Oklahoma in St. Louis-San Francisco
Ry. Co. ti. WilliamnsU and in Kithcart v. Feldman.35 In the former case a
night policeman, whose custom was to inspect the night freight trains of
defendant railroad company on their arrival, was held an invitee,36 but
there had been a special request made to the mayor and chief of police by
the chief special officer of defendant railroad company that he continue this
custom. In the latter case, however, the court held that a policeman enter-
ing defendant's premises for the purpose of making an arrest was a mere
licensee.37
S. J. B.
TORTS-FIRST INJURY AS PROXIMATE CAUSE OF SUBSEQUENT INJURY-
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-[District of Columbia].-The plaintiff, in the
case of S. S. Kresge v. Kenney,1 sustained a fractured pubis bone from a
fall occasioned by the negligence of the defendant company. Ten months
later, while able to move around the house only with the assistance of her
family, and according to the testimony of her physician, in a very weak
state, the plaintiff got out of her bed alone to get a drink of water. In so
doing she fell again and fractured the bone in the same place. The court
declared, as a matter of law, that the original negligence was not the cause
of the injuries sustained by the second fall, which was chiefly caused by
her own contributory negligence.
In an effort to prove her contentions the plaintiff cited various cases in
which an injured person was allowed to recover for the effects of a second
injury which had taken place during the period of recovery from the first.2
Answering these authorities the court pointed out that "each case must rest
largely upon its own facts, since there are usually such variations in the
facts of others as to make them not persuasive. ' 3 The fact which differ-
entiated the case under discussion from those cited was the imprudence of
the plaintiff in attempting to do something which she should have known
was outside her physical powers.
In the case of Hartnett v. Tripp4 the plaintiff was injured the second
time when the crutch he was using slipped from beneath him. The use of
would cause danger of injury to the person or property of the other, a duty
arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger."
34. 56 P. (2d) 815 (Okla. 1936).
35. 215 Pac. 419 (Okla. 1923).
36. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Williams, supra, note 34 at p. 816.
37. Kithcart v. Feldman, supra, note 35 at p. 420.
1. 4 U. S. Law Week 30 (D. C. App., 1936).
2. Hartnett v. Tripp, 231 Mass. 382, 121 N. E. 17 (1918); Smith v.
Northern Pac. R. R. Co., 79 Wash. 448, 140 Pac. 685 (1914) ; Hoseth v. Pres-
ton Mill Co., 49 Wash. 682, 96 Pac. 423 (1908) ; Papic v. Freund, 181 S. W.
1161 (Mo. App., 1916); Wagner v. Mettendorf, 232 N. Y. 481, 134 N. E.
539 (1922); Brown v. Beck, 63 Cal. App. 686, 220 Pac. 14 (1923).
3. S. S. Kresge Co. v. Kenney, at p. 30.
4. Hartnett v. Tripp, supra, note 2.
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a crutch, said the court, was a usual and proper incident of recovery, and
is often recommended by physicians as a means of strengthening the weak-
ened member. In Smith v. Northern Pac. R. Co. concerned with a similar
set of facts, the court said, "If a person receives an injury through the
negligent act of another and the injury in afterwards aggravated and a
recovery retarded through some accident not the result of want of ordinary
care on the part of the injured person, he may recover for the entire injury
sustained, as the law regards the probability of such aggravation as a se-
quence and natural result likely to flow from the original injury."0 A Mis-
souri case,7 in a similar situation, has a dictum which agrees with this rea-
soning, and cases in other jurisdictions are harmonious.3
Although the majority of minds would probably agree that the use of a
crutch as an aid in recovery is not imprudent, perhaps not all would agree
that going for a carriage ride during convalescence, and subjecting oneself
to all the elements of possible danger therein, would be prudent. A Missouri
court, however, in Conner v. City of Nevada9 came to the conclusion that
such would not be negligence, and although it was not necessary for the
decision in the case the court declared that "if she (plaintiff) was guilty
of no negligence * * * and an accident happened to her in which the result
was more serious because of her then condition than it would have been
if she had not already been afflicted, such more serious result in reality
becomes the result of the first accident."'01 Two other eases where the
results of the second injury were more remote from the original negligence
than in the typical crutch case are Brown v. Beek"l and Stahl v. Southern
Michigan R. Co.12 In the first the administrators of the plaintiff recovered
for his death by congestive pneumonia on the ground that in exercising with
crutches he fell and was forced to lie quietly in bed for a longer time than
would ordinarily have been necessary and as a result congestive pneumonia
developed. The second case allowed recovery for a second injury which was
caused when a suit-case plaintiff was packing fell against her leg which
was weak from the previous injury.
Another group of cases' 3 related to this subject are those in which the
original injury has been aggravated by the physician treating the case.
5. Smith v. Northern Pac. R. R. Co., 79 Wash. 448, 140 Pac. 685 (1914).
6. Ibid., p. 687.
7. See Papic v. Freund, 181 S. W. 1161 (Mo. App., 1916).
8. Cases in note 2, and Hyvonen v. Hector Iron Co., 103 Minn. 331, 115
N. W. 167 (1908); Keonse v. Standard Steel Works Co., 221 Mo. App. 1231,
300 S. W. 531 (1927); Campbell v. Brown, 267 N. W. 877 (Mich., 1936);
O'Keefe v. K. C. Western R. R. Co., 87 Kan. 322, 124 Pac. 416 (1912).
9. 188 Mo. 148, 86 S. W. 256 (1905).
10. Ibid., p. 260.
11. 63 Cal. App. 686, 220 Pac. 14 (1923).
12. 24 Mich. 350, 178 N. W. 710 (1920).
13. Hughes v. Maryland Casualty Co., 76 S. W. (2d) 1101 (Mo. App.,
1934) ; Staehlin v. Hochdoerfer, 235 S. W. 1060 (Mo., 1921) ; Smith v. K. C.
R. Co., 208 Mo. App. 139, 232 S. W. 261 (1921) ; Keown v. Young 129 Kan.
563, 283 Pac. 511 (1930) ; Smith v. Mo. Kan. and Texas R. R. Co., 76 Okla.
303, 185 Pac. 70 (1919) ; Rohmer v. Anderson, 189 Ill. App. 274 (1914).
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Although cases of this sort are primarily concerned with negligent inter-
vening third parties, they incidentally bear on the contributory negligence of
the plaintiff. For if the plaintiff has been negligent in securing a capable
physician he is prevented from recovering.
The majority rule, therefore, is that where the second injury is caused
in part by the negligence or imprudence of the plaintiff there can be no
recovery for the second injury. Where there has been no negligence or im-
prudence recovery may be had. But the question as to what is negligence
or imprudence still exists, and must be determined by the facts in each case.
In the principal case the plaintiff was definitely imprudent. In the case of
Conner v. City of NevadaU4 two thoughtful persons might have reached dif-
ferent conclusions as to the prudence of the plaintiff. While in the typical
crutch case there is little question that, assuming careful manipulation,
the use of crutches is not negligence.
By way of caution it should be added that where the first injury has
healed as much as it is going to heal, but has left a permanent affliction,
such as a short leg, a subsequent injury resulting in part from the first
injury is independent of the first and no damages can be obtained from the
first tort feasor."5 As for example, where a person with a game leg caused
by the negligence of the first wrong-doer cannot recover from that person
for a subsequent injury by being struck by an automobile because of an in-
ability to dodge quickly.
B. W. T.
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-ATTRACTIVE NuIsANcE DOCTRINE--[Tennessee].
The defendant company owned a town with a drainage culvert and a
connecting drainage ditch. During an "unusually heavy rain" the plain-
tiff's young child, playing near the drainage ditch, stepped off the side, was
drawn in by the suction near the mouth of the culvert, and was drowned.
Plaintiff maintains that defendant's drainage system at this place was "in-
adequate, insufficient, unfit and unsafe" and that the construction of the
culvert was especially dangerous and attractive to young children. Held;
even if this were a case of attractive nuisance the defendant would not be
liable under the doctrine if the object was of such a character that it would
be impractical to guard against it.,
This case is in line with the rule adhered to in all jurisdictions following
the attractive nuisance doctrine, namely, that if the practicability of the
object would be destroyed by the precautions which would be necessary to
prevent injury to children attracted by it, the defendant will be relieved of
liability.2 The widely quoted case of Peters v. Bowman sums up very clearly
14. Supra, note 9.
15. Powers v. Kansas City, 18 S. W. (2d) 545 (Mo., 1929; Croak v. Croak
33 S. W. (2d) 998 (Mo., 1931) ; but see See. 460 Restatement, Torts (appar-
ently in conflict).
1. McCay v. Du Pont Rayon Co., 96 S. W. (2d) 177 (Tenn., 1936).
2. Missouri has so held in a number of cases. Carey et al. v. Kansas
City, 187 Mo. 715, 86 S. W. 438 (1905) (reservoir in park); Overholt v.
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